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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that since China closes her asset markets, investors turn to Hong Kong 
instead. The initial public offerings (IPO) of Chinese firms in the Hong Kong stock market 
and the local housing market of Hong Kong improve the prediction of each other, as they 
may serve as a coordinator of herds among investors. Alternative explanations such as the 
“production conjecture” and “underlying factor conjecture” are found to be inconsistent 
with the data. Our results are also consistent with the increasing importance of Chinese 
tourists in the world. Directions for future research are also discussed.  
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“… But if we look up confidence in the dictionary, we see that it is more than 
a prediction. The dictionary says that it means “trust” or “full belief.” The 
word comes from the Latin fido, meaning “I trust.” The confidence crisis that 
we are in at the time of this writing is also called a credit crisis. The word 
credit derives from the Latin credo, meaning “I believe.”… In good times, 
people trust. They make decisions spontaneously. They know instinctively that 
they will be successful… Asset values will be high and perhaps also 
increasing…. When people are confident they go out and buy; when they are 
unconfident they withdraw, and they sell. Economic history is full of such 
cycles of confidence followed by withdrawal.” 
George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, Animal Spirits, 2009.  
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1.Introduction 
 
The emergence of China as a great economic power has been widely recognized. For 
instance, according to the World Development Indicators, in 2000, the aggregate GDP for 
China, Germany, Japan, U.K. and the U.S. were approximately (all in constant 2000 dollars) 
1,198 billions, 1,886 billions, 4,731 billions, 1,477 billions and 9,899 billions respectively. 
By 2011, these figures became 3,541 billions, 2,131 billions, 5,059 billions, 1,756 billions 
and 11,744 billions respectively. These figures show that China has indeed overtaken some 
major economies in terms of the aggregate GDP. If China has appreciated her currency 
(Renminbi) as much as some commentators had suggested, the GDP figures of China in the 
recent decade could be even more pronounced. 
  
Empirical researches suggest that on average, a high economic growth is associated 
with a high return in the stock market.
1
 Thus, it would be natural to suggest that one should 
invest in the China stock market. On the other hand, it may not be easy for individual 
investors to “capture” such phenomenal growth financially. For one thing, China does not 
open her asset markets. Information flows in China is under severe monitoring and very 
often non-local investors can only make “guesses”. Foreigners have limited participation in 
the Chinese real estate and stock markets. Foreign financial intermediations are only 
allowed to provide limited services to Chinese customers in restricted areas. In fact, 
Renminbi, the currency of China, is not even convertible.  
 
Since investors do not have full access of the Chinese asset markets, some would 
choose to invest in correlated markets. Among those markets, Hong Kong is often 
highlighted for a variety of reasons. On top of the geographical and cultural proximities, 
there may also be some sound economic reasons. Trades in goods and services, as well as 
factors’ mobility between mainland China and Hong Kong began in the 1970s, and since 
then continued to grow (Sung, 1991). Due to the large flow of visitors between Hong Kong 
and the Mainland China, Hong Kong has access to more updated information about China. 
In addition, many authors (see Genberg and He, 2008 and the reference therein) have 
shown evidences that the economic activities between China and Hong Kong are closely 
related. Therefore, if there are some good news in China (including productivity growth, 
favorable economic policies, etc.), Hong Kong economy will typically be benefited. The 
good news would also be “capitalized” in the Hong Kong asset markets. In addition, some 
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 Among others, see Levine (2002), Levine and Zervos (1998). 
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Chinese corporations are listed in the Hong Kong stock market and investors can trade 
them directly. In fact, some studies demonstrate that there are indications for increasing 
integration between the stock markets of China and Hong Kong (for instance, see Cheng 
and Glascock, 2005). 
 
This paper attempts to contribute to the literature by considering a special segment of 
the stock market, which is the IPO (initial public offerings), i.e. the first sale of stock of a 
private company to the public. The activities of IPO have received increasing attention in 
both the media and the academic circle. Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
review this literature.
2
 It seems fair to summarize that the previous literature focuses on the 
microeconomic aspect of IPO. To complement the literature, this paper attempts to focus on 
a macroeconomic issue, namely, how IPO activities interact with the real estate market. In 
previous researches (for instance, Case and Quigley, 2007; Case, Quigley and Shiller, 
2005), they emphasized on the wealth effects of both the stock market and real estate 
market on the consumption. However, this paper finds that the IPO value relative to the 
total market capitalization is typically negligible. Thus, the movement of the IPO should 
have no significant wealth effect, and may therefore identify a separate channel through 
which the stock market and the real estate markets can be related. The following figure 
shows the case of Hong Kong and confirms this statement graphically. 
 
(Insert Figure 1) 
 
The case of Hong Kong is selected by this paper with good reasons. Despite its small 
geographical size, Hong Kong is an important financial market in the region. Hong Kong is 
the second largest Asian financial market (Newell et al, 2007). According to a recent study, 
out of the 20 largest IPO in Asia for the period 1997-2011 (in terms of the current year 
nominal value), 10 of them are held in Hong Kong.
3
 Wall Street Journal (2012) even states 
that “for the third year in a row the world’s leading exchange for new stock offerings was 
located not in New York, but in Hong Kong”.4 In terms of the real estate market, Hong 
Kong has a very good legal system (Newell et al, 2007). Leung, Wong and Cheung (2007) 
shows that in terms of the average number of transactions per unit of housing, Hong Kong 
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For instance, different aspects of IPO, including the issuing activity, under-pricing, and long-run 
performance, etc. have been widely discussed in the literature. Among others, interested readers are referred 
to survey papers such as Ritter and Welch (2002), Yong (2007), among others. 
3
 See Appendix 1C for details. 
4
 Clearly, the literature on IPO is too large to be reviewed here. The appendix provides a summary of some 
selected papers. 
 5 
housing market is several times more “liquid” than the U.S. In addition, the boundary of 
Hong Kong is fixed by the Basic Law. The fixed boundary and constrained supply of land 
also facilitate the comparison across different time periods. Moreover, Hong Kong has a 
simple tax system, maintains a constant exchange rate throughout the sampling period, and 
provides equal treatments to foreign investors. All these features contribute to our choice of 
Hong Kong for the case study.  
 
How can the IPO activities be related to the real estate markets? One possible channel 
is that an increase (decrease) in IPO activities may reflect an improvement (or deterioration) 
of the “market sentiment” (among others, Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Cornelli, Goldreich, 
and Ljungqvist, 2006; Helwege and Liang, 2004). In fact, stock market IPO is included in 
the list of variable which is used to construct the “market sentiment” variable (Brown and 
Cliff, 2004), and indeed IPO activity is the only time series available for Hong Kong 
during our sampling period (see Appendix 2). Alternatively, IPO might reflect that the 
businessmen are confident of the economic future, and thus raise funds through IPO for 
investments and further expansions (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). Investors express their 
trust to the businessmen through subscribing the IPO. Thus, the IPOs of Chinese firms help 
to coordinate the “herd” of investors in HK.5 
  
This hypothesis seems to be consistent with the previous literature as well as the 
particular situation of Hong Kong.
6
 Among others, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) find that 
social interactions would affect the stock market participation. It should be noticed that 
while the IPO in the United States is mainly marketed to institutional investors, individual 
investors have a much larger share in Hong Kong. It is partly due to the fact that the 
underwriters in Hong Kong typically will make the minimum amount of stock IPO 
subscription very affordable and hence allows much more individual investors to 
participate.
7
 And since the Chinese economy which is not completely transparent, the 
“market sentiment” may play an even larger role. 
 
                                                 
5
 We are very grateful to Paul Anglin for suggesting this interpretation. 
6
 For instance, Lee, Wong, and Yuen (2007) find that, among others factors, investors’ experience, media’s 
report, margin and electronic applications, and family and friend recommendations are the significant factors 
that positively relate to the frequency of individual investors to subscribe IPO in Hong Kong. 
7
 This seems to be a general practice in Hong Kong. For instance, while the Lehman Brothers Bonds are 
typically sold to institutional investors and private equity in the USA and Europe, Lehman Brothers Mini-
Bonds are marketed in Hong Kong and Singapore. When Lehman bankrupts, many individual investors lost 
their life-time savings and led to a series of political protest and demonstrations. For more details, see  
http://www.stockbrokerfraudblog.com/2008/11/protestors_in_asia_decrying_le_1.html.  
 6 
Another feature which distinguishes Hong Kong from the Western countries is the 
lack of channels for individuals to invest in commercial real estate. For instance, Hong 
Kong does not have any REIT until very recently.
8
 Thus, for the individual investors who 
hold an “optimistic” view, they can only invest in housing market or to subscribe IPO in the 
stock market. Notice that as the housing units in Hong Kong are mainly owned by 
individual households, which is similar to the case in the United States, households may 
play a more important role than institutional investors and developers. And since 
households would arguably be more vulnerable to “market sentiment” and “social 
interactions”, the “market sentiment channel” may appear more significantly in the housing 
market than in the commercial real estate market. In fact, Wang et al (2000), Leung et al 
(2013) have proposed that “over-confidence” on the household side may explain a 
significant portion of the housing market dynamics in Hong Kong. This paper can be 
understood as an indirect test of that class of “conjecture”. If the “market sentiment” is 
indeed the driving force, we would observe a positive and significant relationship between 
the IPO and the housing market, but not necessarily the commercial real estate markets. For 
the future reference, we label this possible channel as “the animal spirits conjecture”, or 
“speculation conjecture”. 
 
Another merit for choosing Hong Kong to “test” the animal spirits conjecture relates 
to the government policy. Companies from all over the world are welcomed to list their 
stocks in Hong Kong, with neither discrimination nor favouritism. Thus, the IPOs listed in 
Hong Kong include those from Hong Kong domestic firms, Mainland China firms, as well 
as foreign firms. And since the major operations and income sources of the Mainland and 
foreign firms are outside Hong Kong, a comparison of the cases of domestic firms, Chinese 
firms and foreign firms would shed further light on the validity of the “animal spirits 
conjecture”. We will get back to this point later.  
 
Can the IPO activities be related to the real estate markets for other reasons? One 
possibility is that the funds generated from IPO are used for the business growth, which 
would lead to a significant amount of trading in the commercial real estate market. Brau, 
Ryan and DeGraw (2006) suggest that 82% of the CFO responded that the issuance of IPO 
is to gain additional financing for immediate and long-term growth. On the other hand, 
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 REIT is introduced to Hong Kong in 2005, and hence for most of the sampling period, it is not an option for 
the investors. Even now, the share of commercial real estate owned by REIT is very small in Hong Kong. The 
sizes of REIT are generally very small in Hong Kong. For more details, see the appendix 3, Leung and Tang 
(2012), among others. 
 7 
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) find that the primary reason for going public is to 
rebalance their accounts. Needless to say, the funds allocation strategies may vary from 
firm to firm, and from country to country. One of our conjectures is that when firms obtain 
fund through IPO, they will invest in commercial real estate, among other things.
9
 And thus 
when the number or the real value of IPO increases, more funds will be channeled to the 
commercial real estate market. As a result, the commercial real estate price would also 
increase. We label this as our “production conjecture.” 
 
Alternatively, the IPO activities may also be a signal of the conditions of overall 
economy. It may be that there are variables that are “seen by agents but not the 
econometrician” (Hamilton and Whiteman, 1985). In other words, some important 
variables are left out from the system and the regression model is essentially mis-specified. 
Recent research also indicates the importance of “news shock” (shocks that will affect the 
future but not the current period productivity) in accounting for the aggregate business 
cycles (for instance, see Beaudry and Portier, 2006, 2007; Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2007).  
Thus, when those “good signals” appear, the economy is expected to improve. More 
companies will issue IPO to raise capital from the market.
10
 At the same time, there will be 
more business expansion, including more investment in the commercial real estate markets. 
As a result, both IPO issues and commercial real estate prices will increase. In fact, the 
same underlying factor that can drive both the IPO activities and commercial real estate 
market could potentially drive the housing market as well. For instance, Kan et al (2004), 
Leung (2007) show in a dynamic equilibrium model that a productivity shock can lead to 
an increase in output, an increase in the stock price, as well as in prices of both commercial 
and residential real estates, and find support from U.S. city level data. Thus, we could 
observe co-movements among all real estate markets and the stock market activities 
(including IPO) driven by some “omitted variable.” For the future reference, we will label 
this class of explanation as our “underlying factor conjecture.”  
 
                                                 
9
 Notice that even foreign and Mainland China firms have investment in the Hong Kong real estate market. 
For firm-level evidence of commercial real estate investment of Chinese firms, see Dong et al (2012), among 
others. 
10
 At the micro-level, there are many studies which suggest the signaling effect of IPO issuance activities. 
Among others, Chen, Jhou and Yeh (2007) suggest that the IPO underwriter retention rate can serve as a 
signal of the firm value to investors, which can reduce the information asymmetry between issuers and 
investors. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) proved that under-pricing of IPO is a credible signal to investors, 
because only good firms can recoup the loss after their performances are realized. In the aggregate, therefore, 
if the number of IPO issuance increases, it may means that there are many good firms raising capital from the 
market and the aggregate output is expected to be high. 
 8 
    It may be instructive to summarize the discussion up to this point. The “animal spirits   
conjecture” and “underlying factor conjecture” would predict the relationship between 
housing market and IPO, while “production conjecture” and “underlying factor conjecture” 
is used to determine the relationship between commercial real estate market and IPO. Since 
all these theories on the relationship between the IPO activities and the real estate market 
are logically plausible, it demands an empirical investigation to verify which is 
quantitatively more significant. Putting it in another way, the degrees of co-movement 
among the IPO activities, the commercial real estate, and the residential housing provides 
an indirect test (or confirmation) for alternative conjectures. Clearly, if all these conjectures 
fail, then we will not find any relationship between the IPO activities and the real estate 
markets. And it seems to be the “priors” of many economists, as reflected in many seminars 
and conferences when this paper was presented. On the other hand, any statistically 
significant relationship identified between the IPO activities and real estate markets would 
constitute a “new stylized fact” to be explained. Table 1 summarizes the discussion. 
 
(Insert Table 1) 
 
The organization of this paper is presented as follows. The next section will briefly 
discuss the data construction. The methodology applied in this research will then be 
described. The following section presents the empirical results, and its economic 
interpretation. The appendix will follow a concluding section. 
 
2 Data  
 
     The study collects the time series of stock market indices, housing prices and macro-
economy indicators from the government websites and CEIC, which covers the period from 
January 1994 to December 2011 [Table 2]. We proceed with several steps. First, all 
nominal variables have to be deflated by consumer price index
11
, so that the real variables 
are used throughout the analysis. Second, we check the stationarity of the series. It is 
instructive to take a look of the time plots of each variable, and then confirm the ordering 
by Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test
12
. Third, we will perform some statistical test, 
which will be explained in the next section. 
                                                 
11
 In Hong Kong, the government produces several consumer price indices. CPI (A) represents the 
consumption bundle of the most of the population. In case of the best lending rate, the real rate is equal to the 
nominal rate minus the inflation rate. 
12
 Details are available upon request. 
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(Insert Table 2) 
 
    Let’s briefly explain the movements of each variable. Clearly, as shown in figures 2 and 
3, the number and real value of IPO do not exhibit any trend for the sampling period. 
Particularly, there are three peaks to be noticed. The first one is the “asset bubble period” in 
1997 (for instance, see Barton, 2007), where the adverse selection problem may be serious 
in the market; the second one is the recovery of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS)
13
 in 2004, where the firms’ profits were (temporarily) suppressed by the SARS 
disease and they chose to raise funds from the stock market, hoping that it would catch the 
attention of long-term investors; and the last one is the recovery from the collapse of  
Lehamn Brothers in 2009. When we further dis-aggregate the data, it is found that IPO 
activity was mainly originated from the Chinese firms (figures 4 and 5), at which they treat 
Hong Kong financial market as a platform to promote its brand name to international 
investors.  
 
(Insert Figures 2 to 5) 
 
    As in the case of many other economies, stocks and real estates are the two most 
common investment vehicles in Hong Kong. In early 1990s, Asian countries including 
Hong Kong experienced rapid economic growth. The speculations in stock market and real 
estate market raised the prices to a peak and created an asset bubble (among others, see 
Barton 2007). During the Asian financial crisis, there was a significant withdrawal of 
international funds, which induced a “fire sale” and consequently a collapse of asset prices 
(Chen and Leung, 2008; Leung and Tang, 2012). After the SARS infection in 2003, the 
Beijing government allowed the people from Mainland China to visit and invest in Hong 
Kong through “individual travel” scheme. Since then the real estate prices “regained the 
momentum’’, so to speak, and they started to catch up with the stock price. On the other 
hand, the discrepancy between the Hang Seng Index and the Hang Seng China Enterprise 
Index may reflect the relative economic development of Hong Kong and China. As shown 
by the Figure 6, the former used to stay above the latter. However, in 2003, because of the 
rapid development in China, Chinese stocks became an attractive investment to investors, 
and HSCEI rose sharply. This results to a narrowing of dispersion of the two curves in 2006 
                                                 
13
 The virus appears to have originated from Guangdong, China in November 2002. Totally, 1755 people in 
Hong Kong were suffering from this virus. 299 citizens were died from this virus, representing 17% death 
rate, which is the highest proportion over the world. 
 10 
[Table 6]. We test their correlations and find that de-trend financial market and de-trend 
real estate market variables are little correlated with each other. Instead, strong correlations 
exist among de-trend HSI and de-trend HSCEI, as well as de-trend OP with de-trend HP
14
 
and de-trend RP, both representing 1% statistical significance in the whole sampling [Table 
3]. 
 
(Insert Figure 6, Table 3) 
 
    On top of the stock market price, its real trading volume (TV) is also used as the recent 
research suggests it contains important information that is not revealed by prices.
15
 As 
shown in Figure 7, TV has two peaks over the past 14 years. In 1997, a “bubble” was 
created in the hi-tech stocks, which pushed TV to near 6 billion. In 2006, the increased 
participation in the primary and secondary market raises the TV to 10 billion.  
 
(Insert Figure 7) 
 
 
    The best lending rate (BLR) is the rate of interest that banks lent to their favored 
customers. Since Hong Kong is dominated by the adjustable rate mortgage, a reduction in 
BLR encourages more investment in the housing market. Figure 8 plots the movement of 
HSBC
16
 best lending rate, which is very representative for the Hong Kong economy. It 
ranges between -5% to more than 13% during the sampling period (a negative real interest 
rate means that the nominal interest rate is below the inflation rate). 
 
(Insert Figure 8) 
 
 
3 Empirical Results 
 
3.1. Vector Auto-Regressive analysis 
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 Some of the figures are calculated from less than 20 transactions in a certain month. Hence, it is sensitive to 
some particular transactions. For example, the sudden drop in the real office prices in 2006 is mainly due to 
unexpectedly high prices in November and December 2005. 
15
 Clearly, the literature on the importance of trading volume is too large to be discussed here. Among others, 
see Lo and Wang (2000), Leung and Feng (2005) for a review of the literature. 
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In many previous studies of IPO, it focuses on individual stock IPO and hence takes 
the market as given. Our study, on the other hand, allows the interactions between the stock 
market and the real estate market to be happened. An appropriate tool to study such 
interactions is VAR because it does not presume any “exogenous” variable. We first apply 
the VAR model on our monthly data series in order to maximize the number of data points. 
Table 4 describes in detail the variables included in each of the VAR models and its optimal 
lags
17
. Notice that all models include the trading value of stock market, the stock market 
index (Hang Seng Index) and the interest rate (all in real terms). Clearly, the inclusion of 
these variables provides control for the economic fundamentals. These variables perhaps 
reflect some of the “market sentiments” as well.  
 
    (Insert Table 4) 
 
On top of them, Model 1 includes real office price (as a proxy for the commercial real 
estate) as well. When we introduce the IPO activities (number and real value of IPO) in 
Model 1, we obtain Models 2 and 3. Hence, by comparing Model 1 vis-à-vis Model 2 and 3, 
we can highlight the importance of IPO activities. Next, we produce Models 6 to 8 by 
replacing the real office prices in Models 1 to 3 with the prices of real retail property, or 
shortly, real retail prices. Similar method is applied to real housing prices in Models 9 to 
11. Implicit in these formulations is the notion that the behavior of different real estate 
prices can differ. We will verify this conjecture in the empirical analysis in the later part. 
Finally, in models 4 and 5, we only include the variables for economic fundamentals and 
IPO activity, and exclude the real estate prices. Therefore, by comparing Model 4 vis-à-vis 
Models 2, 7 and 10, it is possible to highlight the importance of real estate prices.
18
 
 
    We begin by examining the case of commercial real estate prices. Recall that statistically 
speaking, the better is the model, the smaller would AIC be. Table 5 Panel A shows that 
introducing IPO as an additional variable in the models does not improve the prediction of 
office prices. In addition, Panel B tells that the model without the IPO variables gives the 
best prediction of retail property prices. In other words, no empirical support is found for 
the “production conjecture.” 
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 We run from lag 1 to 6 for all VAR models, and the model with smallest Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) 
gives the best fitting. 
18
 By the same token, the importance of real estate prices can be highlighted by comparing Model 5 vis-à-vis 
Model 3, 8 and 11. 
 12 
    On the other hand, Panel C of table 5 shows that introducing IPO activities will improve 
the prediction of the housing price. This is consistent with the “animal spirits conjecture” or 
“underlying factor conjecture”. With the increase in the amount of funds raised from IPO, it 
reflects either an improvement of the economic environment or the market sentiment, and 
this motivates investors to participate in the housing market. 
       
    Now we turn to the prediction on IPO. Two interesting points are highlighted in the 
Panels D and E of the Table 5. First, adding housing price could reduce AIC significantly, 
which is consistent with the “animal spirits conjecture” or “underlying factor conjecture”. 
Second, adding office price does not show an improvement of the prediction, which is in 
contrast to the “production conjecture”. 
 
(Insert Table 5) 
 
    In sum, the results show that at least marginally, housing price always plays a more 
important role than the commercial real estate prices in predicting IPO. It is somewhat 
surprising because capital raised from IPO will typically remain with those large 
corporations. Typically, they do not re-invested in the Hong Kong housing market which is 
dominated by a large number of individual occupiers-investors.  In other words, we do not 
find any evidence for the “production conjecture”. However, the evidence can be consistent 
with the “animal spirits conjecture” or “underlying factor conjecture”. To further 
differentiate the two conjectures, we now turn to a more dis-aggregate analysis.  
 
3.2. Granger Causality Analysis 
 
    In the previous section, we apply the VAR model on the aggregate IPO data and find that  
IPO does help to predict the housing price, and vice versa, while commercial real estate 
price does not seem to have much interaction with the IPO market (neither the number nor 
the real value). To improve our understanding, we would now dis-aggregate the IPO data 
by the company origin and employ the Granger Causality test for the analysis.
19
 Since the 
test for some variables are very sensitive to the selected number of lags, we choose the lags 
from 1 to 6 for the monthly data set. The majority rule would decide whether X Granger 
causes Y. For robustness, we also apply AIC criteria to choose the optimal lag, and base on 
this lag to decide the causality relationship of the variables.  
                                                 
19
 See Hamilton (1994) for more details. 
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    Let’s first focus on housing market. As summarized in Table 6, based on AIC criteria, 
Chinese IPO (in terms of number or real value) and housing market does Granger cause 
each other. There is no consistent pattern between the other IPOs and the housing market. 
It is very interesting because the activities of Chinese firms are mainly operated in 
Mainland China. Intuition might suggest that the IPO of Chinese firms should not exert any 
direct effect on the Hong Kong housing market, but in fact, they do. Previously, we have 
also shown that IPO constitutes a tiny component of the total market capitalization and 
hence the “wealth effect” is unlikely to be the explanation. This apparently “puzzling” 
phenomenon can however be consistent with the “animal spirits conjecture”. IPO of 
Chinese firms may signal a continuation or even further improvement of the Chinese 
economy. Since some of the economic growth would “spillover” to the Hong Kong 
economy, the housing demand is expected to increase. Alternatively, the IPO of Chinese 
firms may reflect an improvement of the “market sentiment” and hence stimulate the 
investment in the housing market and hence the real housing price. With such anticipation, 
people would buy the housing today speculatively, as an attempt to capture the benefit of 
the expected economic growth of China. And the additional fact that the IPO of Hong Kong 
firms do not granger cause or caused by the Hong Kong housing market seems to provide a 
challenge for the “production conjecture” to be valid in this sample.  
 
    Needless to say, there is always an alternative explanation. In the current context, it is the 
“underlying factor conjecture”. In that case, the IPO of Chinese companies serves as a 
leading indicator of the economic boom in the subsequent periods, which will also lead to 
an increase in the housing price. To further differentiate these two competing hypotheses, 
we would examine the interactions between the office price and the IPO market.  
 
(Insert Table 6) 
 
    Table 7 reveals a striking pattern that the Hong Kong and Chinese IPO (whether 
measured in terms of number or real value) does not Granger cause office and retail 
property prices. This is clearly at odd with the “production conjecture” because at least 
some funds that are raised by Hong Kong companies IPO should be invested in Hong Kong, 
including the commercial real estate. In addition, it presents a challenge to the “underlying 
factor conjecture” because it is not clear why the “unobservable underlying factor” 
stimulates only the housing market but not the office and retail property markets. 
 
 14 
    One may argue that the lack of evidence of interactions between the IPO activities and 
the commercial real estate market is related to the company financing method. It may be 
that companies prefer using internal financing to external financing for expansion (Gaud, 
Hoesli and Bender, 2007), and if they choose external one, bank financing is always 
preferable to listing of stocks (Jebjerg and Kyhl, 1999). While this may be true, it makes 
the relationship between the IPO and the housing market even more puzzling, because 
individual households do not finance their home purchase with IPO neither. 
 
(Insert Table 7) 
 
3.3. Out of Sample Forecasting 
 
    Thus far, we have used VAR (Vector Auto-Regressive models) and Granger Causality 
analysis to evaluate competing theories. In a sense, these are all “in-sample-fitting.” In the 
literature, there are discussions about whether one should use in-sample-fitting (ISF) or 
out-of-sample-forecasting (OSF) as a criterion to evaluate models, including Cheung, 
Chinn and Pascual (2005), Inoue and Kilian (2004), Meese and Rogoff (1983), among 
others. It seems that there is no consensus on the issue. In this section, we will provide 
some simple OSF as an alternative assessment for competing theories.  
 
    To perform OSF, our first step is to re-estimate all of our VAR models for the sample 
1994M1 to 2006M12. We find that the point estimates are similar to the full sample version, 
except that the “optimal numbers of lags” may change in some models.20 We then take 
those VAR models to predict the values of different variables during the period 2007M1 to 
2011M12, and then confront with the data. Following the literature, we use two metrics to 
measure the performance of the models. They are the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and 
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE): 
     
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1
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ii yyhTRMSEyyhTMAE  , 
where T is the sample size, h is the forecast horizon (i.e. how many periods ahead we need 
to predict, yi is the true value, and ŷi = E(yi+h | Ωi ) is the h-period ahead forecast given the 
period i information set, Ωi. Clearly, the RMSE tends to “punish big mistakes more heavily” 
                                                 
20
 Details will be available upon request. 
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than the MAE. Apparently, there is no consensus of which measure is better, so we use 
both measures in our evaluation. 
 
    Table 8 displays the OSF results of different models. As usual, our first column 
(counting from the left to right) always represents the model with only the basic set of 
variables. Panels A and B show that adding IPO does not improve the forecast of office 
price and retail price respectively. However, as shown in Panel C, adding IPO does 
improve the forecast of housing price. To some extent, these results are consistent with our 
earlier findings that “animal spirit conjecture” holds while the other two conjectures fail. 
 
(Insert Table 8) 
  
    More encouraging results can be found in Panels D and E. Relative to the “basic model,” 
adding retail property price helps to predict IPO activities. It is consistent with the 
conjecture that an increase in China economic growth would encourage more firms to 
launch IPO in Hong Kong stock market and at the same time stimulates the demand of 
retail property, probably through investors and tourists. At the same time, since there is no 
channel for individuals to invest in the Hong Kong office market, office price is not 
affected by number of IPO. 
 
3.4 Robustness check 
 
    In this section, we are going to confirm our main findings by doing sub-period analysis. 
Since Hong Kong was attacked by Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the market fundamentals 
may change thereafter
21
, and this motivates us to check whether the same results hold for 
the two sub-samples. Specifically, throughout the robustness check, we divide the sample 
into two sub-periods: the first sub-period is from Jan 1994 to Dec 1999 and the second sub-
period is from Jan 2000 to Dec 2011. 
     
    Table 9 present the results of the VAR analysis, which are revealing. In the first sub-
sample, it is shown that the prediction of office price is significantly improved with the 
introduction of IPO [Panel A1, Table 9]. In addition, the prediction of the house price is the 
best without any IPO variable [Panel C1, Table 9]. At the same time, the prediction of the 
number of IPO is significantly improved with the inclusion of the house price [Panel D1, 
                                                 
21
 Refer to Leung and Tang (2011) for details. 
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Table 9]. Thus, it seems that there is some evidence for each of the conjectures. In the 
second (i.e. Jan. 2000 and after), the picture is very different. Introducing the IPO variables 
do not significantly improve the prediction of office price and retail property price [Panel 
A2, B2, Table 9]. On the other hand, IPO variables help to improve the prediction of house 
price [Panel C2, Table 9]. In addition, the inclusion of the office price or retail property 
price would actually worsen the prediction of the number of IPO, whereas the inclusion of 
house price can improve it [Panel D2, Table 9]. The inclusion of house price also leads to 
the greatest improvement in the prediction of the real value of IPO, among all different 
property prices [Panel E2, Table 9]. Clearly, the second sub-period provides very clear 
support of the “animal-spirit conjecture” only. Thus, our findings are consistent with the 
observation that China enjoys significant economic growth since 2000, and therefore the 
more active China’s IPO, the more confident of the investors. 
 
(Insert Table 9) 
 
    In the robustness check on the relationship between dis-aggregate level of IPO and real 
estate markets, it reveals that Chinese IPO and housing market granger cause each other in 
second sub-sample, which provides further supporting evidence of “animal spirits 
conjecture” [Table 10]. In addition, the possibilities of “production conjecture” and 
“underlying factor conjecture” can be eliminated because the IPO activity and commercial 
real estate market do not granger cause each other [Table 11].  
 
(Insert Tables 10 and 11) 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
    The IPO activities and the real estate prices could be related through the “production 
conjecture”, the “underlying factor conjecture”, or the “animal spirits conjecture” (or 
“speculation conjecture”). In this paper, we attempt to determine which conjecture is more 
consistent with the data. We employ different econometric tools in our investigation. 
 
    The results from VAR models on aggregate basis show that the prediction of the housing 
market can be improved by the introduction of IPO variables, and vice versa, validating the 
“animal spirits conjecture.” On the other hand, the prediction of office and retail market 
cannot be improved by adding IPO variables, and vice versa, which seems to be at odd with 
both “production conjecture” and “underlying factor conjecture.” 
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    Granger causality test is then applied on more dis-aggregate IPO data. Consistent results 
are found. Commercial real estate market and IPO market do not granger cause each other. 
In addition, even IPO by Hong Kong firms do not Granger cause or caused by the Hong 
Kong housing market. These results seem to be at odd with the “production conjecture” and 
“underlying factor conjecture.” On the other hand, the “animal spirits conjecture” is 
confirmed by the causality relationship between housing market and IPO of Chinese firms.  
 
    The analysis is extended to the out-of-sample forecasting. Particularly, the introduction 
of IPO activity does not improve the forecasting of commercial real estate prices, while it 
reduces the forecasting error of housing prices, and thus providing strong evidence to 
support our findings. 
 
    Finally, we perform robustness check by dividing the data into two subsamples. 
Interestingly, while there is evidence consistent with each of the conjectures in the first sub-
period, the second sub-period, which spans from Jan 2000 to Dec 2011 where China 
experiences substantial economic growth, provides support only to the “animal spirits 
conjecture.”  
 
    The robustness check also confirms that our “animal spirits conjecture” is consistent 
with the observation that an improvement of the Chinese economy will lead to more 
tourism activities in Hong Kong and hence stimulate the retail property price. In fact, the 
United Nations’ World Tourism Organization recently reports that the number of 
international trips made by Chinese travellers grew from 10 million in 2000 to 83 million in 
2012. And the spending by Chinese tourists in 2012 is $102 billion.
22
 If the Chinese 
economy and related tourism continues to expand, the findings of this paper may also be 
relevant to other countries. Future research should investigate the impact of Chinese 
tourists and investors on the real estate markets. 
    Future research can be extended in other directions as well. First, this and other studies 
have confirmed the importance of the “animal spirits” or the “market sentiment” in both the 
financial market and real estate market. More effort should be devoted to further investigate 
the mechanism behind such sentiment. Secondly, many research efforts suggest including 
                                                 
22
 For more details, see UPI (2013). 
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real estate to achieve diversification benefits.
23
 In light of the results here, it would be 
interesting to investigate what the optimal portfolio as well as the optimal trading rules 
would be. Thirdly, there is an increasing attention towards Chinese economies. More efforts 
are needed to study the investors’ preferences in investing in China. Last but not the least, 
more research efforts should be devoted to investigate if there are other segments of the 
stock market interact with the real estate market, and if so, what the mechanisms are.  
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Table 1 Summaries of the implication of different conjectures 
 
  
Housing            IPO 
 
 
Commercial Real Estate            IPO 
Animal Spirits conjecture  X 
 
Production conjecture X  
Underlying Factor 
conjecture 
  
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Table 2 Data Description and Summary Statistics 
 
Sampling Period: 1994M1 – 2011M12 
 
 Symbol Mean SD Max Min Order Source 
Number of Initial 
Public Offerings 
NO_IPO 4.13 3.38 18.00 0.00 I(0) Hong Kong Exchange and 
Clearing Limited 
(http://www.hkex.com.hk) Real Dollar Value of 
Initial Public 
Offerings (HKD mn) 
RD_IPO 21.50 35.66 234.81 0.00 I(0) 
Real Trading Value 
in Stock Market 
(HKD mn) 
TV 5428.16 5819.27 32958.69 405.18 I(1) 
Real Hang Seng 
Index 
HSI 139.54 44.10 297.46 63.82 I(1) 
Real Office Price 
Index 
OP 1.48 0.61 2.79 0.57 I(1) Rating and Valuation 
Department 
(www.rvd.gov.hk) Real Retail Price 
Index 
RP 1.43 0.53 3.02 0.79 I(1) 
Real Housing Price 
Index 
HP 1.03 0.26 1.63 0.60 I(1) 
Real Best Lending 
Rate 
BLR 5.04% 4.01% 13.68% -5.12% I(1) Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority 
(www.info.gov.hk/hkma) 
China Real GDP 
(seasonal adjusted) 
CGDP 42926.89 29247.46 117888.3 8632.49 I(1) CEIC 
Real Retail Sales 
Value (CNY mn, 
seasonal adjusted) 
RRSV 180.60 39.34 304.71 124.94 I(1) 
Number of Visitors 
from China 
(seasonal adjusted) 
VFC 822432.8 651224.2 2526836 102996 I(1) 
Number of Visitors 
from Foreign 
(seasonal adjusted) 
VFF 841960.1 188803.9 1176794 128599 I(1) 
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Table 3 Correlations between Real Estate Markets and Stock Market 
 
 DOP DRP DHP DHSI DHSCEI 
DOP 1     
DRP 0.34*** 1    
DHP 0.56*** 0.47*** 1   
DHSI 0.06 0.08 0.05 1  
DHSCEI -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.77*** 1 
 
*** denotes 1% statistical significance 
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Table 4 Summary of the variables used in VAR 
 
Models 
 
Model 
#1 
Model 
#2 
Model 
#3 
Model 
#4 
Model 
#5 
Model 
#6 
Model 
#7 
Model 
#8 
Model 
#9 
Model 
#10 
Model 
#11 
OP            
RP            
HP            
TV            
HSI            
BLR            
NO_IPO            
RD_IPO            
Optimal 
lag 
5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 
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Table 5 AIC of monthly VAR Models 
 
Sampling period: 1994M1 to 2011M12 
 
Panel A: 
 Prediction of OP 
without IPO  
(Model #1) 
Prediction of OP with 
NO_IPO  
(Model #2) 
Prediction of OP with 
RD_IPO  
(Model #3) 
AIC -2.5819 -2.4781 -2.5028 
 
Panel B: 
 Prediction of RP 
without IPO 
(Model #6) 
Prediction of RP with 
NO_IPO 
(Model #7) 
Prediction of RP with 
RD_IPO  
(Model #8) 
AIC -2.9579 -2.9460 -2.9561 
 
 
Panel C: 
 Prediction of HP 
without IPO 
(Model #9) 
Prediction of HP with 
NO_IPO 
(Model #10) 
Prediction of HP with 
RD_IPO  
(Model #11) 
 
AIC -4.2193 -4.2428 -4.2687 
 
 
Panel D: 
 Prediction of 
NO_IPO without 
OP, RP & HP 
(Model #4) 
Prediction of 
NO_IPO with 
OP 
(Model #2) 
Prediction of 
NO_IPO with 
RP 
(Model #7) 
Prediction of 
NO_IPO with 
HP 
(Model #10) 
AIC 5.2439 5.2403 5.1995 5.1984 
 
 
Panel E: 
 Prediction of 
RD_IPO without 
OP, RP & HP 
(Model #5) 
Prediction of 
RD_IPO with 
OP 
(Model #3) 
Prediction of 
RD_IPO with 
RP 
(Model #8) 
Prediction of 
RD_IPO with 
HP 
(Model #11) 
AIC 37.4645 37.4697 37.4437 37.3926 
 
* Details of the VAR results will be available upon request. 
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Table 6 Granger Causality Test in housing market 
 
Sampling period: 1994M1 to 2011M12 
 
Panel A: 
Number of IPO of the 
corresponding companies 
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger 
causes 
housing price 
Granger caused 
by housing 
price 
Helps to 
predict 
housing price 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
housing price 
1. Hong Kong company X X X X 
2. China company     
3. Foreign company X  X X 
 
 
Panel B:  
 
Real IPO value of the 
corresponding companies 
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger 
causes 
housing price 
Granger caused 
by housing 
price 
Helps to 
predict 
housing price 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
housing price 
1. Hong Kong company X X X X 
2. China company     
3. Foreign company X X X  
 
 
* Details of the results are available upon request. 
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Table 7 Granger Causality Test in commercial real estate market 
 
Sampling period: 1994M1 to 2011M12 
 
Panel A: 
 
Panel B:  
 
# In each cell of this column, the first entry represents whether IPO variable granger causes offices, 
while the second entry represents whether IPO variable granger causes retail property. 
^ In each cell of this column, the first entry represents whether IPO variable is granger caused by offices, 
while the second entry represents whether IPO variable is granger caused by retail property. 
 
** Details of the results are available upon request. 
 
 
  
Number of IPO of the 
corresponding companies  
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger causes 
office / retail 
property price # 
Granger caused 
by office / retail 
property  price ^ 
Helps to predict 
office / retail 
property price # 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
office / retail 
property price ^ 
1. Hong Kong company X / X X / X X / X X / X 
2. China company X / X  /  X / X   /  
3. Foreign company X /  X / X  / X X / X 
Real IPO value of the 
corresponding companies  
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger causes 
office / retail 
property  price # 
Granger caused 
by office / retail 
property price ^ 
Helps to predict 
office / retail 
property price # 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
office / retail 
property  price ^ 
1. Hong Kong company X / X X / X X / X X / X 
2. China company X / X  /  X / X  /  
3. Foreign company X / X X / X X / X X / X 
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Table 8 Out-of-Sample Forecasting Results 
 
(In-sample period: 1994M1 – 2006M12; out-of-sample period: 2007M1 – 2011M12) 
 
Panel A: Out-of-Sample Forecasting of Office Price 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Mean absolute error 0.0629 0.0688 0.0694 
Root mean square error 0.0792 0.0868 0.0875 
 
 
Panel B: Out-of-Sample Forecasting of Retail Property Price 
 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Mean absolute error 0.0524 0.0528 0.0532 
Root mean square error 0.0691 0.0694 0.0700 
 
 
Panel C: Out-of-Sample Forecasting of Housing Price 
 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Mean absolute error 0.0389 0.0383 0.0363 
Root mean square error 0.0469 0.0459 0.0429 
 
 
Panel D: Out-of-Sample Forecasting of Number of IPO 
 
 Model 4 Model 2 Model 7 Model 10 
Mean absolute error 3.6946 3.7356 3.5284 3.7029 
Root mean square error 4.7706 4.9773 4.6309 4.9642 
 
 
Panel E: Out-of-Sample Forecasting of Real Value of IPO 
 
 Model 5 Model 3 Model 8 Model 11 
Mean absolute error 3.33E+07 3.11E+07 3.30E+07 3.02E+07 
Root mean square error 5.32E+07 5.09E+07 5.31E+07 5.04E+07 
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Table 9 Robustness check: AIC of monthly VAR Models in two sub-sample periods 
 
Sub-sample 1: 1994M1 – 1999M12 
 
Panel A1: 
 Prediction of OP 
without IPO  
(Model #1) 
Prediction of OP with 
NO_IPO  
(Model #2) 
Prediction of OP with 
RD_IPO  
(Model #3) 
AIC -1.5685 -1.7165 -1.5401 
 
Panel B1: 
 Prediction of RP 
without IPO 
(Model #6) 
Prediction of RP with 
NO_IPO 
(Model #7) 
Prediction of RP with 
RD_IPO  
(Model #8) 
AIC -2.3511 -2.3226 -2.3250 
 
Panel C1: 
 Prediction of HP 
without IPO 
(Model #9) 
Prediction of HP with 
NO_IPO 
(Model #10) 
Prediction of HP with 
RD_IPO  
(Model #11) 
 
AIC -3.6474 -3.2924 -3.4594 
 
Panel D1: 
 Prediction of 
NO_IPO without 
OP, RP & HP 
(Model #4) 
Prediction of 
NO_IPO with 
OP 
(Model #2) 
Prediction of 
NO_IPO with 
RP 
(Model #7) 
Prediction of 
NO_IPO with 
HP 
(Model #10) 
AIC 4.8372 4.8285 4.8680 4.6340 
 
Panel E1: 
 Prediction of 
RD_IPO without 
OP, RP & HP 
(Model #5) 
Prediction of 
RD_IPO with 
OP 
(Model #3) 
Prediction of 
RD_IPO with 
RP 
(Model #8) 
Prediction of 
RD_IPO with 
HP 
(Model #11) 
AIC 36.3205 36.3442 36.2974 36.3393 
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Sub-sample 2: 2000M1 – 2011M12 
 
Panel A2: 
 Prediction of OP 
without IPO  
(Model #1) 
Prediction of OP with 
NO_IPO  
(Model #2) 
Prediction of OP with 
RD_IPO  
(Model #3) 
AIC -3.2378 -3.1975 -3.2434 
 
Panel B2: 
 Prediction of RP 
without IPO 
(Model #6) 
Prediction of RP with 
NO_IPO 
(Model #7) 
Prediction of RP with 
RD_IPO  
(Model #8) 
AIC -3.3439 -3.3492 -3.2815 
 
Panel C2: 
 Prediction of HP 
without IPO 
(Model #9) 
Prediction of HP with 
NO_IPO 
(Model #10) 
Prediction of HP with 
RD_IPO  
(Model #11) 
 
AIC -4.7437 -4.8026 -4.7538 
 
Panel D2: 
 Prediction of 
NO_IPO without 
OP, RP & HP 
(Model #4) 
Prediction of 
NO_IPO with 
OP 
(Model #2) 
Prediction of 
NO_IPO with 
RP 
(Model #7) 
Prediction of 
NO_IPO with 
HP 
(Model #10) 
AIC 5.3293 5.3537 5.3447 5.3210 
 
Panel E2: 
 Prediction of 
RD_IPO without 
OP, RP & HP 
(Model #5) 
Prediction of 
RD_IPO with 
OP 
(Model #3) 
Prediction of 
RD_IPO with 
RP 
(Model #8) 
Prediction of 
RD_IPO with 
HP 
(Model #11) 
AIC 37.7537 37.6956 37.6863 37.5925 
 
 
* Details of the VAR results will be available upon request. 
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Table 10 Robustness check: Granger Causality Test in housing market in two sub-samples 
 
Sub-sample 1: 1994M1 – 1999M12 
 
Panel A1: 
Number of IPO of the 
corresponding companies 
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger 
causes 
housing price 
Granger caused 
by housing 
price 
Helps to 
predict 
housing price 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
housing price 
1. Hong Kong company X X X X 
2. China company X  X X 
3. Foreign company X  X  
 
 
Panel B1:  
 
Real IPO value of the 
corresponding companies 
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger 
causes 
housing price 
Granger caused 
by housing 
price 
Helps to 
predict 
housing price 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
housing price 
1. Hong Kong company X X X X 
2. China company    X 
3. Foreign company X X X X 
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Sub-sample 2: 2000M1 – 2011M12 
 
Panel A2: 
Number of IPO of the 
corresponding companies 
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger 
causes 
housing price 
Granger caused 
by housing 
price 
Helps to 
predict 
housing price 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
housing price 
1. Hong Kong company X X X X 
2. China company     
3. Foreign company  X  X 
 
 
Panel B2:  
 
Real IPO value of the 
corresponding companies 
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger 
causes 
housing price 
Granger caused 
by housing 
price 
Helps to 
predict 
housing price 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
housing price 
1. Hong Kong company X X X X 
2. China company     
3. Foreign company X    
 
 
 
 
* Details of the results are available upon request. 
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Table 11 Robustness check: Granger Causality Test in commercial real estate market in two sub-
samples 
 
Sub-sample 1: 1994M1 – 1999M12 
 
Panel A1: 
 
Panel B1:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of IPO of the 
corresponding companies  
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger causes 
office / retail 
property price # 
Granger caused 
by office / retail 
property  price ^ 
Helps to predict 
office / retail 
property price # 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
office / retail 
property price ^ 
1. Hong Kong company X / X X / X X / X X / X 
2. China company  / X X /   / X X /  
3. Foreign company X / X X / X X / X X / X 
Real IPO value of the 
corresponding companies  
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger causes 
office / retail 
property  price # 
Granger caused 
by office / retail 
property price ^ 
Helps to predict 
office / retail 
property price # 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
office / retail 
property  price ^ 
1. Hong Kong company X / X X / X X / X X / X 
2. China company  /  X /   /  X /  
3. Foreign company X / X X / X  / X X / X 
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Sub-sample 2: 2000M1 – 2011M12 
 
Panel A2: 
 
Panel B2:  
 
 
 
# In each cell of this column, the first entry represents whether IPO variable granger causes offices, 
while the second entry represents whether IPO variable granger causes retail property. 
^ In each cell of this column, the first entry represents whether IPO variable is granger caused by offices, 
while the second entry represents whether IPO variable is granger caused by retail property. 
 
** Details of the results are available upon request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of IPO of the 
corresponding companies  
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger causes 
office / retail 
property price # 
Granger caused 
by office / retail 
property  price ^ 
Helps to predict 
office / retail 
property price # 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
office / retail 
property price ^ 
1. Hong Kong company X / X X / X X / X X / X 
2. China company  / X  /  X /    /  
3. Foreign company X /  X / X X /  X / X 
Real IPO value of the 
corresponding companies  
Using majority rule Using AIC criteria 
Granger causes 
office / retail 
property  price # 
Granger caused 
by office / retail 
property price ^ 
Helps to predict 
office / retail 
property price # 
Helps to be 
predicted by 
office / retail 
property  price ^ 
1. Hong Kong company X / X X / X X / X X / X 
2. China company X / X  /  X / X  /  
3. Foreign company X / X X / X X / X X / X 
 33 
Figure 1 Ratio of the value IPO to the total market capitalization against time 
 
 
 
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (www.hkex.com.hk) 
 
 
Figure 2 Number of IPO against time 
 
 
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (www.hkex.com.hk) 
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Figure 3 Real value of IPO against time 
 
 
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (www.hkex.com.hk) 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Composition of IPO (By number of IPO companies) 
 
 
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (www.hkex.com.hk) 
  
0 
20,000,000 
40,000,000 
60,000,000 
80,000,000 
100,000,000 
120,000,000 
140,000,000 
160,000,000 
180,000,000 
200,000,000 
220,000,000 
240,000,000 
260,000,000 
Ja
n
-9
4
 
Ja
n
-9
5
 
Ja
n
-9
6
 
Ja
n
-9
7
 
Ja
n
-9
8
 
Ja
n
-9
9
 
Ja
n
-0
0
 
Ja
n
-0
1
 
Ja
n
-0
2
 
Ja
n
-0
3
 
Ja
n
-0
4
 
Ja
n
-0
5
 
Ja
n
-0
6
 
Ja
n
-0
7
 
Ja
n
-0
8
 
Ja
n
-0
9
 
Ja
n
-1
0
 
Ja
n
-1
1
 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
Ja
n
-9
4
 
Ja
n
-9
5
 
Ja
n
-9
6
 
Ja
n
-9
7
 
Ja
n
-9
8
 
Ja
n
-9
9
 
Ja
n
-0
0
 
Ja
n
-0
1
 
Ja
n
-0
2
 
Ja
n
-0
3
 
Ja
n
-0
4
 
Ja
n
-0
5
 
Ja
n
-0
6
 
Ja
n
-0
7
 
Ja
n
-0
8
 
Ja
n
-0
9
 
Ja
n
-1
0
 
Ja
n
-1
1
 
Foreign 
HK 
China 
 35 
Figure 5 Composition of IPO (By value of IPO companies) 
 
 
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (www.hkex.com.hk) 
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Figure 6 Time plot of the real Hang Seng Index (HSI), real Hang Seng China Enterprise Index 
(HSCEI), real office price index (OP), real retail price index (RP) and real housing price index 
(HP) (rebased as 100 at Jan 1994) 
 
 
Sources: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (www.hkex.com.hk) and Rating and 
Valuation Department (www.rvd.gov.hk) 
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Figure 9 Real trading value in Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
 
 
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (www.hkex.com.hk) 
 
 
Figure 10 Best Lending Rate 
 
 
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority (www.info.gov.hk/hkma) 
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APPENDIX 
  
Appendix 1 
 
This appendix attempts to summarize some related previous literature with tables. 
 
A: Previous literature on the relationship between the variables of stock market and 
performance of initial public offerings 
 
 Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) 
Alvarez and Gonzalez 
(2005) 
Buttimer, Hyland, and 
Sanders (2005) 
Jain and Kini (2006) 
NAREIT index N.A. N.A. Positive and significant N.A. 
Excess monthly return N.A. N.A. Positive and significant N.A. 
Market adjusted return N.A. Positive and significant N.A. N.A. 
Small minus big N.A. N.A. Positive and significant N.A. 
High minus low N.A. N.A. Positive and significant N.A. 
Cahart’s (1997) 
momentum variable 
N.A. N.A. Negative N.A. 
Bond interest rate N.A. N.A. Positive N.A. 
Bond default rate N.A. N.A. Positive N.A. 
Assets before listing Negative and significant Negative N.A. N.A. 
Offering size N.A. Positive N.A. Positive 
ROA in previous year N.A. Positive N.A. N.A. 
Fraction of shares 
retained by original 
owners 
Positive and significant Positive N.A. Positive 
Online subscription Positive and significant N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Investor banker 
prestige 
Positive and significant N.A. N.A. Positive and 
significant 
Risk of offering N.A. N.A. N.A. Negative 
 
 
B: Previous literature on the factors affecting the frequency of applying IPO shares in Hong 
Kong 
 
 McGuinness (1993) Vong (2006) Lee, Wong, Yuen (2007) 
Investors’ education level N.A. N.A. Negative and significant 
Investors’ experience N.A. N.A. Positive and significant 
Media’s information N.A. N.A. Positive and significant 
Online subscription  N.A. N.A. Positive and significant 
Margin subscription N.A. N.A. Positive and significant 
Investment Horizon N.A. N.A. Negative and significant 
Reading prospectus N.A. N.A. Positive and significant 
Family recommendation N.A. N.A. Positive and significant 
Friend recommendation N.A. N.A. Positive and significant 
Weighted P/E ratio N.A. Positive and significant N.A. 
Average % change of HSI 
in the last three months 
Positive Positive and significant N.A. 
Earnings / Assets Positive and significant N.A. N.A. 
Net assets Positive and significant N.A. N.A. 
Age of the firm Positive and significant N.A. N.A. 
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C: Twenty largest IPO in Asia 
 
The following table shows that Hong Kong has been involved in several large scale IPO. 
 
Rank Issuing date Issuer Funds raised 
(US billion) 
Nation / Country Industries Stock Exchange 
1 July 2010 Agricultural Bank of China 19.228 China Banking Hong Kong / 
Shanghai 
2 Oct 2006 Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China 
19.092 China Banking Hong Kong / 
Shanghai 
3 Oct 1998 NTT Mobile 18.099 Japan Telecommunications Tokyo 
4 Oct 2010 AIA 17.816 Hong Kong Insurance Hong Kong 
5 May 2006 Bank of China 11.186 China Banking Hong Kong / 
Shanghai 
6 Mac 2010 Dai-ichi Mutual Life 
Insurance 
10.986 Japan Insurance Tokyo 
7 Nov 1997 Telstra Corp 9.819 Australia Telecommunications New York 
8 Oct 2005 China Construction Bank 9.227 China Banking Hong Kong / 
Shanghai 
9 Jul 2009 China Engineering 7.592 China Capital goods and 
services 
Shanghai 
10 Apr 2007 Citic Bank 5.946 China Banking Hong Kong 
11 Nov 2007 China Railway 5.877 China Construction Hong Kong 
12 Oct 2007 China Telecom 4.225 China Telecommunications New York 
13 Dec 2007 China Pacific Insurance 4.071 China Insurance Shanghai 
14 Oct 1997 Indosat 3.970 Indonesia Telecommunications New York 
15 Jan 2006 Lotte Department Store 3.739 South Korea Retail London 
16 Dec 2003 China Life 3.475 China Life insurance New York 
17 Oct 2000 Sinopec Corp 3.462 China Oil & natural gas Hong Kong 
18 June 2005 China Shenhua 3.276 China Coaling Hong Kong 
19 Mar 2000 Petrochina 2.891 China Oil & natural gas New York 
20 Nov 2005 The Link REIT 2.790 Hong Kong Real estate 
investment trust 
Hong Kong 
 
(Source: Renaissance Capital, www.renaissancecapital.com) 
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Appendix 2: IPO and Market Sentiment 
 
This appendix shows that for Hong Kong during the sampling period, IPO is indeed the 
only data series that is available for formal analysis. 
 
Table A2-1:  A Summary of the availability of “Market sentiment variables” used by Brown 
and Cliff (2004) 
 
 
Close-fund funds Not available 
IPO 1994 – present; monthly; HKEX;  
employed by this paper 
Liquidity HKEX takes surveys in 1999 and 2004 
about the liquidity of stock market. 
Percentage change in margin borrowing Not available 
Percentage change in short interest Not available 
Ratio of short sales to total sales 1999 – present; monthly; HKEX 
Odd-lot sales to purchases Not available 
Put-to-call trading volume 1996 - 2008; 1996-1999  yearly; 2000 – 
2008 monthly; HKEX 
Activity by non-commercial traders Not available 
Activity by small traders Not available 
Expected volatility / current volatility Not available 
Net purchases of mutual funds Market value and trading value for 
exchange-traded fund is available from 2005 
(HKEX). 
SMB Not available 
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Appendix 3: Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) in Hong Kong 
 
The history of REIT in Hong Kong can be traced back to 25 November 2005, where Link 
(00803), the first REIT, was introduced. Link holds the retail facilities and carparks 
acquired from Hong Kong Housing Authority, and these properties are all located near 
public housing. The market capitalization of Link was 64.377 billion in December 2011, 
which is the biggest REIT in Hong Kong. Other than Link, seven REITs with relatively 
small market capitalization were launched in the market, which made up to a total eight 
REITs in 2011 [Table A3-1]. In terms of market capitalization, Link overall shares nearly 
half of the REIT market in Hong Kong [Figure A3-1], and the whole REIT market 
constitutes less than 1% of the total [Figure A3-2]. 
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Table A3-1 Real Estate Investment Trust in Hong Kong 
 
 
 
Stock Market Capitalization (as at 30 December 2011 = 17.452 HKD billion) 
Sources: Datastream and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stock 
Code 
Name of REIT Starting date 
of trading 
Market Capitalization 
(HKD billion) 
(as at 30 December 
2011) 
Share of Stock 
Market 
Capitalization 
(%) 
00823 Link Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
25 November 
2005 
64.337 
 
0.369 
00808 Prosperity Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
16 December 
2005 
2.041 0.012 
00405 GZI Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
21 December 
2005 
3.656 0.021 
02778 Champion Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
24 May 2006 14.473 0.083 
00435 Sunlight Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
21 December 
2006 
3.551 0.020 
01881 Regal Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
30 March 
2007 
5.830 0.033 
87001 Hui Xian Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
29 April 2011 17.834 0.102 
00778 Fortune Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
20 Apr 2010 6.370 0.036 
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Figure A3-1 Share of REIT market in Hong Kong 
 
Source: Datastream 
 
 
Figure A3-2 Market Capitalization of REIT relative to Total Market Capitalization 
 
 
Sources: Datastream and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited 
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